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1659 
OPENING THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATE: 
WHY THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD 
ADOPT THE STANDARD ANNOUNCED IN 
TATRO v. UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA TO 
PERMIT THE REGULATION OF CERTAIN 
NON-CURRICULAR STUDENT SPEECH IN 
PROFESSIONAL PROGRAMS 
Abstract: Free speech in public schools has long been a divisive and intriguing 
issue. The topic is particularly contentious in post-secondary education where 
many of the maturity-driven and family surrogate rationales for restricting stu-
dent speech fall away. Furthermore, with the advent of the Internet and the explo-
sion of social media, it is now nearly impossible to draw a meaningful line be-
tween student speech rights on school grounds and student speech rights beyond 
them. This Note examines what happens when a student enrolled in a post-
secondary program violates an established code of conduct or professional ethics 
using a non-curricular form of Internet communication. This Note argues that the 
most effective way to regulate speech in this context is by adopting the standard 
announced by the Minnesota Supreme Court in 2012 in Tatro v. University of 
Minnesota, which states that a university is entitled to impose academic sanctions 
for Internet communication that violates academic program rules provided that 
those rules are “narrowly tailored and directly related to established professional 
conduct standards.” 
INTRODUCTION 
Consider the following hypothetical situations: a public university student 
takes a picture of a cadaver during an anatomy lab and posts that picture on 
Instagram; a student at a public medical school posts about a patient’s medical 
condition on Facebook; a student at a public law school reveals private client 
information in a public blog.1 
In these three examples, a student may have violated both program rules 
and an established code of professional conduct or ethics.2 Assuming that the 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509, 511 (Minn. 2012) (providing the basis for the 
defining characteristics of these hypotheticals). Defining characteristics include the involvement of a 
student in a post-secondary program, the existence of an established professional code of conduct, and 
off-campus, non-curricular student speech in violation of those professional codes of conduct. See id. 
 2 See id. (discussing the appropriateness of sanctions against a mortuary science student for Face-
book posts that violated academic program rules and professional conduct standards). 
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student’s speech occurred in a non-curricular setting, however, the current ju-
risprudence on free speech in public schools would more than likely insulate 
that student from academic sanctions.3 In other words, the student’s university 
could not lawfully alter the student’s grades, suspend the student, or otherwise 
punish the student in any way.4 
This strange result occurs because these non-curricular “professional pro-
gram” incidents occupy a very small niche relative to other non-curricular 
speech in the student speech landscape.5 Indeed, public universities are not 
generally permitted to police or restrict off-campus student speech that occurs 
through social media outlets like Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and other pub-
lic blogging sites.6 In today’s world of hyper-connectivity, university control 
over such speech would enable a school to reach far beyond its curricular pur-
view, nearly without restriction, into the personal lives of students.7 
The U.S. Supreme Court has decided speech cases involving both primary 
and secondary schools, but has yet to consider a student speech case relating to 
                                                                                                                           
 3 See Will Creeley & Greg Lukianoff, New Media, Old Principles: Digital Communication and 
Free Speech on Campus, 5 CHARLESTON L. REV. 333, 335 (2011) (pointing to a “consistent string of 
legal precedent dating back more than two decades, making clear that speech codes—university regu-
lations prohibiting expression that would be constitutionally protected in society at large—are uncon-
stitutional at public universities”); Emily Gold Waldman, University Imprimaturs on Student Speech: 
The Certification Cases, 11 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 382, 392 (2013) (noting that although educational 
concerns are relevant in non-curricular professional cases, those concerns alone must fail to “tell the 
whole story” because it is “very unlikely” that a school could otherwise constitutionally punish stu-
dent speech in such a situation). “Non-curricular” speech is any speech occurring away from school 
grounds that could not be reasonably construed as reflecting the school’s imprimatur. See Hazelwood 
Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988).  
 4 See Creeley & Lukianoff, supra note 3, at 335; Waldman, supra note 3, at 392. Notably, even if 
a public university student signs an agreement, which would otherwise constitute a binding contract, a 
university generally “cannot impose a course requirement that forces a student to agree to otherwise 
invalid restrictions on her free speech rights.” See Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 521 n.6. 
 5 See Waldman, supra note 3, at 388 (identifying professional speech cases as a limited exception 
within the university setting where the general presumption of greater First Amendment protection 
does not hold true either “factually or normatively”). This Note defines “professional programs” as 
post-secondary programs that offer degrees in professional fields guided by an established code of pro-
fessional conduct or ethics. See Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 520. 
 6 See Greg Lukianoff & Will Creeley, Facing Off Over Facebook, PHOENIX, Mar. 2, 2007, 
http://thephoenix.com/boston/news/34242-facing-off-over-facebook, archived at http://perma.cc/
MT58-NPUU (demonstrating the potential for First Amendment violations where speech codes are 
permitted to reach beyond school campuses and into social media). 
 7 See Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 521 (acknowledging that adopting a broad rule allowing social media 
regulation would “allow a public university to regulate a student’s personal expression at any time, at 
any place, for any claimed curriculum-based reason”); Angela Thomas, ‘MSN Was the Next Big Thing 
After Beanie Babies’: Children’s Virtual Experiences as an Interface to Their Identities and Their 
Everyday Lives, 3 E–LEARNING 126, 126 (2006), available at http://www.wwwords.co.uk/pdf/
validate.asp?j=elea&vol=3&issue=2&year=2006&article=2_Thomas_ELEA_3_2_web, archived at 
http://perma.cc/AX9G-FJFZ?type=pdf (arguing that, for children, their virtual and physical spaces are 
seamlessly integrated). 
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a university.8 Because of the danger that overreaching regulation poses to free 
speech in universities, however, it is critical to apply those cases narrowly 
when developing appropriate regulation for professional speech.9 Specifically, 
any regulation of speech must be narrowly tailored and directly related to the 
restriction of non-curricular professional code violations and must not be so 
overbroad as to offend the First Amendment rights of students.10 
This Note argues that the U.S. Supreme Court should adopt the standard 
articulated in 2012 by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Tatro v. University of 
Minnesota for university regulation of non-curricular professional speech.11 
Part I of this Note examines four U.S. Supreme Court student speech cases and 
their varied adaptations by lower courts to the modern age of virtual communi-
cation.12 Part II of this Note explains that either the extension of U.S. Supreme 
Court precedent or the adoption of Tatro v. University of Minnesota would be a 
viable framework for the regulation of student speech in professional pro-
grams.13 Finally, Part III of this Note argues that both positive and normative 
reasons exist for allowing schools to regulate student speech in some instances 
of non-curricular professional student speech and that the standard announced 
in Tatro is the most effective way to accomplish that goal without unduly in-
fringing upon the First Amendment rights of students.14 
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATE: MAPPING THE 
BOUNDARIES OF FREE SPEECH IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
The degree to which the First Amendment protects speech in public 
schools has long been debated.15 Indeed, as recently as 2007 the U.S. Supreme 
Court did not unanimously agree that the First Amendment was originally in-
                                                                                                                           
 8 See McCauley v. Univ. of the Virgin Is., 618 F.3d 232, 247 (3d Cir. 2010) (cautioning that be-
cause the U.S. Supreme Court has only decided cases in the context of public elementary and high 
schools, the rulings “cannot be taken as gospel” in the university setting); Waldman, supra note 3, at 
384 (stating that the U.S. Supreme Court has decided only four student speech cases, all of which 
concerned K-12 public education). 
 9 McCauley, 618 F.3d at 247 (explaining that when applying the student speech doctrine from the 
U.S. Supreme Court in the university setting, the decision should be “scrutinized carefully, with an 
emphasis on the underlying reasoning of the rule to be applied”). 
 10 See Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 521 (acknowledging the potential for overbroad university regula-
tions to reach impermissibly into the personal lives of students); Waldman, supra note 3, at 423 (reit-
erating that students “need more autonomy in the non-curricular realm”). 
 11 See infra notes 159–208 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 15–105 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 106–158 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 159–208 and accompanying text. 
 15 See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 413–15 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (discussing 
cases dating back to the early 1800s regarding the restriction and punishment of school speech); Mark 
W. Cordes, Making Sense of High School Speech After Morse v. Frederick, 17 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 657, 657 (2009) (stating that “constitutional analysis for free speech in public schools has long 
generated controversy and confusion”). 
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tended to protect student speech rights.16 At their conception, public schools 
were largely substitutes for private schools, and as such subjected students to 
the strict enforcement of rules meant to instill a core of common values and 
self-control.17 During this time, teachers operated with nearly unlimited discre-
tion in their classrooms and in the punishment of their students through the 
doctrine of in loco parentis.18 Student rights, including free speech rights, were 
severely limited if they existed at all.19 
Rightly or wrongly, however, the U.S. Supreme Court has developed lim-
ited jurisprudence protecting free speech in public schools.20 As the law 
evolved, the Supreme Court briefly granted students full First Amendment pro-
tection, to be coextensive with adults in other contexts.21 In four seminal cases, 
however, the Court would eventually identify a number of exceptions to that 
protection, which would again limit the First Amendment rights of students in 
public schools.22 Although those cases dealt exclusively with the actions of 
                                                                                                                           
 16 See Morse, 551 U.S. at 410–11 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“In my view, the history of public 
education suggests that the First Amendment, as originally understood, does not protect student 
speech in public schools.”). Justice Thomas cited a string of cases involving strong deference to 
schools in the restriction and punishment of student speech stretching from the early 1800s through 
the 1960s to support his proposition that if some right to free speech in schools had existed, the courts 
would have acted to protect it. See id. at 413–15. 
 17 See id. at 411; ALONZO POTTER & GEORGE BARRELL EMERSON, THE SCHOOL AND THE 
SCHOOLMASTER: A MANUAL 125 (1843) (arguing that although education should aim to sharpen the 
intellect, it must also “generate a spirit of subordination to lawful authority” such that it may operate 
upon “moral sentiments and habits” to create “better citizens”). 
 18 Morse, 551 U.S. at 416 (Thomas, J., concurring). In loco parentis, a theory rooted in English 
common law, allows for a parent to delegate partial parental authority to a tutor or schoolmaster for 
their child. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *441. Courts in the United States began using 
the doctrine to enforce school discipline and subordinance in public schools as early as 1837. See 
Morse, 551 U.S. at 413–14 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing State v. Pendergrass, 19 N.C. (2 Dev. & 
Bat. Eq.) 365, 365–66 (N.C. 1837)) (“One of the most sacred duties of parents, is to train up and qual-
ify their children . . . . [T]his duty cannot be effectually performed without the ability to command 
obedience . . . . The teacher is the substitute of the parent . . . and in the exercise of these delegated 
duties, is invested with his power.”). 
 19 See Raul R. Calvoz et al., Cyber Bullying and Free Speech: Striking an Age-Appropriate Bal-
ance, 61 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 357, 365 (2013) (quoting JOHN SOGARD, PUBLIC SCHOOL RELATION-
SHIPS: CHAPTERS ON THE INTERRELATIONSHIPS OF THE SCHOOL OFFICERS, THE TEACHERS, THE 
PUPILS AND THE COMMUNITY 122–23 (1909)) (“The relationship between teacher and pupil on the 
school-grounds is very different from that existing between the same boy and a policeman in a city 
park or in a courthouse yard. The teacher may arrest, try, judge and punish. The policeman may only 
do the first.”). Early American colleges largely mirrored the English model, which “fostered absolute 
institutional control of students by faculty both inside and outside the classroom.” Brian Jackson, 
Note, The Lingering Legacy of In Loco Parentis: An Historical Survey and Proposal for Reform, 44 
VAND. L. REV. 1135, 1140 (1991). 
 20 Morse, 551 U.S. at 410; Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fra-
ser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512–13 
(1969). 
21 See W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 626 (1943). 
 22 Morse, 551 U.S. at 410; Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271; Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685; Tinker, 393 U.S. 
at 512–13. 
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high school students occurring on school grounds or during school-sponsored 
activities, lower courts have since adapted those cases to allow the regulation 
of post-secondary student speech as well as non-curricular and Internet-based 
student speech.23 
Section A of this Part summarizes the existing U.S. Supreme Court prece-
dent on free speech in public schools.24 Section B discusses Internet speech 
and lower court cases addressing whether schools can regulate student speech 
that originates off school grounds.25 Section C of this Part addresses how lower 
courts have applied the Supreme Court’s precedents in the high school setting 
to curricular student speech in the university and professional program con-
text.26 Finally, Section D discusses Tatro, where the Minnesota Supreme Court 
addressed non-curricular professional student speech that violates professional 
program rules and a professional code of ethics.27 
A. Building the Schoolhouse Gate: The U.S. Supreme Court Weighs in on 
Free Speech Rights in Primary and Secondary Schools 
The issue of free speech in public schools first came before the U.S. Su-
preme Court in the 1940s, when challenges arose to state statutes requiring 
students to salute the American flag.28 In 1943, only three years after uphold-
ing such statutes as constitutional, the U.S. Supreme Court in West Virginia 
Board of Education v. Barnette held that these statutes, requiring the expres-
sion of a particular viewpoint in a public forum, unconstitutionally offended 
the First Amendment rights of students in public schools.29 In the wake of 
Barnette, students enjoyed the same free speech rights as those guaranteed to 
adults in other contexts.30 Since 1943, however, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
                                                                                                                           
 23 See infra notes 49–105 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra notes 28–48 and accompanying text. 
 25 See infra notes 49–69 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 70–91 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 92–105 and accompanying text. 
 28 See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 626; Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 599 (1940), 
overruled by Barnette, 319 U.S. at 626.  
 29 See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 626 (overturning Gobitis by holding that students cannot be com-
pelled to “declare a belief”); Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 599 (upholding statutes requiring that students salute 
to the American flag in public schools as constitutional). 
 30 See James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Public Schools, 86 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1347–48 
(2000) (arguing that when the U.S. Supreme Court in Barnette framed the issue as whether the gov-
ernment could force an American citizen to publicly profess a certain statement or belief, it was tacitly 
refusing to separate the rights of students from the rights of citizens in general); see also Calvoz et al., 
supra note 19, at 372 (“[The Barnette] holding is remarkable when one considers that the Court essen-
tially held that the free speech rights of a first grader in her public school classroom are the same as 
those of any other citizen.”). Adults are generally limited only by certain types of speech, including 
“the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or ‘fighting’ words—those which 
by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.” Chaplinsky v. 
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942). 
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established four limited situations in which schools may restrict student 
speech.31 
First, the First Amendment does not protect student speech that either po-
tentially or actually causes a material disturbance to a school or otherwise in-
vades the rights of others.32 Accordingly, in 1969 in Tinker v. Des Moines In-
dependent Community School District, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a 
high school could not suspend students for wearing armbands to protest the 
war in Vietnam where the bands caused no actual or foreseeable disturbance to 
the school.33 In its holding, the Court stated that schools may regulate student 
speech when it “materially and substantially interfere[s] with the requirements 
of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school” or when that speech 
invades the rights of others.34 In applying its new standard, however, the Court 
implied that a school may also prohibit speech that could be reasonably fore-
cast to lead to a substantial disruption or material interference.35 Therefore, 
although the Court held that the prohibition on armbands was unconstitutional, 
the Court’s holding based on the reasonable anticipation of material disruption 
delegated a substantial degree of discretion to school administrators and 
marked a significant retreat from the holding of Barnette.36 
                                                                                                                           
 31 Morse, 551 U.S. at 410; Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271; Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685; Tinker, 393 U.S. 
at 512–13. As the U.S. Supreme Court has explained in its post-Barnette cases, the “rights of students 
in public school[s] are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings.” Fra-
ser, 478 U.S. at 682. 
 32 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512–13. 
 33 Id. In Tinker, the Court noted that wearing armbands to express a certain view was a “symbolic 
act” akin to “pure speech,” which the Court has repeatedly given comprehensive protection. Id. at 505. 
Although the students knew armbands were banned by the administration, they chose to wear them as 
planned and were subsequently suspended. Id. at 504. In upholding the students’ rights to wear the arm-
bands, the Court stated that “First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the 
school environment, are available to teachers and students. It can hardly be argued that either students or 
teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.” Id. 
at 506. It has been noted that although the second sentence is perhaps the more cited part of this quota-
tion, the limiting conditional language of the first sentence has “dominated the Court’s subsequent 
schoolhouse jurisprudence.” Calvoz et al., supra note 19, at 372. 
 34 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512–13 (internal quotations omitted). The Court refined this statement 
further by noting that, “In order for . . . school officials to justify [the] prohibition of a particular ex-
pression of opinion, it must be able to show that its action was caused by something more than a mere 
desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.” 
Id. at 509. 
 35 See id. at 514 (“[T]he record does not demonstrate any facts which might reasonably have led 
school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities 
. . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 36 Compare Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512–13 (holding that public schools can restrict student speech 
that could foreseeably interfere with the operation of the school), with Barnette, 319 U.S. at 626 
(holding that the rights of students were coextensive with those of adults in other contexts); see also 
Calvoz et al., supra note 19, at 373–74 (explaining that by adding foreseeability to its test, the U.S. 
Supreme Court substantially pared back student speech rights). 
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Second, the First Amendment does not protect student speech that would 
“undermine [a] school’s basic educational mission.”37 Accordingly, in 1986 in 
Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, the U.S. Supreme Court held that it 
was well within the discretion of school officials to punish a student who de-
livered a speech with pervasive sexual innuendos during a school assembly.38 
The Court reasoned that both the school’s role in inculcating the “habits and 
manners of civility” as well as the “sensibilities” of fellow students were to be 
considered in such a case.39 The Fraser decision marked a relatively narrow 
retreat from Barnette, however, because it focused largely on the immaturity of 
younger students and the role of K-12 schools in teaching social etiquette.40 
Third, the First Amendment does not prohibit schools from regulating ex-
pressive activities such as theatrical productions and publications, which the 
“public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school,” so 
long as the school’s actions are “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical 
concerns.”41 Thus, in 1988 in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, the 
U.S. Supreme Court upheld the right of a school administrator to restrict the 
content of a school-sponsored newspaper that was produced as part of the 
school’s journalism curriculum.42 In creating the standard, the Court reasoned 
that the mere toleration of student speech—which it addressed Tinker—was a 
wholly different issue than the affirmative promotion of student speech, which 
was before the Court in Hazelwood.43 This new standard allowed school offi-
cials much greater latitude in regulating school speech bearing the imprimatur 
of the school.44 In fact, the Court held that not only may a school regulate 
school-sponsored speech that might substantially interfere with the school as 
provided by Tinker, but further that the school might also limit school-
                                                                                                                           
 37 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685. 
 38 Id. at 677–78. The Fraser decision highlights the in loco parentis role of public schools in the 
K–12 context. See id. at 684 (noting that the Court’s jurisprudence has “recognize[d] the obvious 
concern on the part of parents, and school authorities acting in loco parentis, to protect children—
especially in a captive audience—from exposure to sexually explicit, indecent, or lewd speech”). 
 39 Id. at 681. 
 40 Compare Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685 (focusing on the sensibilities and morals of younger students 
to justify the moderation of age-inappropriate speech), with Barnette, 319 U.S. at 626 (referring to 
students as general members of the citizenry in protecting their rights). 
 41 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271. 
 42 Id. at 273, 276. In Hazelwood, a school principal removed two articles—one concerning three 
students’ experiences with pregnancy and the other concerning divorce—from a school-sponsored 
newspaper. Id. at 263. The Court noted that activities bearing the imprimatur of a school “may fairly 
be characterized as part of the school curriculum, whether or not they occur in a traditional classroom 
setting.” Id. at 271. 
 43 Id. at 270–71. 
 44 Id. “It is only when the decision to censor a school-sponsored publication, theatrical produc-
tion, or other vehicle of student expression has no valid educational purpose that the First Amendment 
is so directly and sharply implicated, as to require judicial intervention to protect students’ constitu-
tional rights.” Id. at 273 (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted). 
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sponsored speech that was simply “ungrammatical, poorly written, inadequate-
ly researched, biased or prejudiced, vulgar or profane, or unsuitable for imma-
ture audiences.”45 
Finally, the First Amendment does not prohibit the regulation of student 
speech at school-sponsored events that might be reasonably viewed as promot-
ing illegal drug use.46 Accordingly, in 2007 in Morse v. Frederick, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that a school could suspend a student for unveiling a ban-
ner at a school-sponsored event reading “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.”47 The Court 
reasoned that because a failure to act would have arguably condoned the stu-
dent’s message, the school was well within its rights to suspend the student.48 
B. Struggling with the Internet and Virtual Space:  
The Courts Divide Over Tinker 
The advent of the Internet—and with it social media—has created a sig-
nificant gap for lower courts in the already limited U.S. Supreme Court juris-
prudence on student speech.49 As the accessibility of the Internet and the prev-
alence of social media have increased, lower courts have been forced to con-
sider both “where” Internet speech occurs and the intrusive implications that 
result if Internet speech can be regulated based simply upon where it is ac-
cessed.50 
Although Tinker’s “schoolhouse gate” once served as a bright line sepa-
rating the rights of students inside school and out, the Internet has called into 
question the usefulness and accuracy of such a physical distinction.51 One 
                                                                                                                           
 45 Id. 
 46 Morse, 551 U.S. at 410. 
 47 Id. at 396. 
 48 Id. at 410. The Court noted that Congress has provided billions of dollars to support state drug-
prevention programs and has declared that schools are partially responsible for educating students on the 
dangers of illegal drug use. Id. at 408. 
 49 See Kara D. Williams, Comment, Public Schools vs. MySpace & Facebook: The Newest Chal-
lenge to Student Speech Rights, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 707, 710 (2008) (observing that the U.S. Supreme 
Court has yet to hear a student speech case involving the Internet, while lower courts have decided the 
issue multiple times). 
 50 Benjamin F. Heidlage, Note, A Relational Approach to Schools’ Regulation of Youth Online 
Speech, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 572, 589 (2009) (arguing that Supreme Court jurisprudence is more diffi-
cult to apply to online speech because it is accessible everywhere and is therefore ever more likely to 
become subject to regulation); see also infra notes 55–69 and accompanying text (discussing several 
courts and commentators struggling with the application of U.S. Supreme Court precedent to student 
speech online). 
 51 See Heidlage, supra note 50, at 588–89; see also supra note 33 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Tinker’s “schoolhouse gate”). The Internet complicates the school speech analysis largely be-
cause it can be viewed either in physical or virtual space with different analytic results. See Orin S. Kerr, 
The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law, 91 GEO. L.J. 357, 357 (2003). Virtually, the Internet can 
be construed as its own independent space, while physically, the Internet is simply a communication 
network, which may be fixed to the actual locations of its users. See id. at 359–60. The difficulty is that 
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scholar has noted that, “[f]or children, there is no dichotomy of online and off-
line, or virtual and real; the digital is so much intertwined into their lives and 
psyche that the one is entirely enmeshed with the other.”52 This shrinking di-
vide between home and campus life caused by the Internet creates a high risk 
that any regulation of student cyberspeech will be especially invasive.53 The 
omnipresent character of the Internet has resulted in a split among courts and 
scholars, with some favoring a “geographic” approach and others favoring an 
“impact” approach to regulating student cyberspeech.54 
A shrinking group of courts and commentators advocate for a “geograph-
ic” approach to school speech regulation.55 Drawing from the “schoolhouse 
gate” language of Tinker, the geographic approach requires that a student’s 
online activity must physically occur or be physically accessed on school 
grounds before a court can proceed to Tinker’s substantial disruption analy-
                                                                                                                           
both constructions are perfectly legitimate and therefore it becomes exceptionally difficult to pinpoint 
“where” Internet speech occurs. See Heidlage, supra note 50, at 588. 
 52 Thomas, supra note 7 at 126. Teens today have been called the “Facebook Generation or digi-
tal natives” because of their close identification with technology. Masuma Ahuja, Teens Are Spending 
More Time Consuming Media, on Mobile Devices, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2013, http://
www.washingtonpost.com/postlive/teens-are-spending-more-time-consuming-media-on-mobile-
devices/2013/03/12/309bb242-8689-11e2-98a3-b3db6b9ac586_story.html, available at http://perma.
cc/Z6CJ-6RYX (internal quotations omitted) (“Today’s teens spend more than 7 1/2 hours a day con-
suming media—watching TV, listening to music, surfing the Web, social networking, and playing 
video games . . . .”). 
 53 See Heidlage, supra note 50, at 588–89 (arguing that because the Internet expands the “poten-
tial reach of communication,” what once might have been a message from one person to another now 
may easily be forwarded and shared, creating the immediate potential for substantial disruption and 
consequentially enabling or necessitating school discipline). 
 54 See Heidlage, supra note 50, at 589; see also infra notes 55–69 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the arguments for and against each approach by commentators and courts). It should be noted 
that, to date, courts have almost exclusively applied Tinker to off-campus student cyberspeech. Wil-
liams, supra note 49, at 719. This is because the rationale of Hazelwood—that speech must reflect the 
imprimatur of the school—has generally been considered inconsistent with the nature of non-
curricular student speech. Id. 
 55 See, e.g., Mahaffey v. Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d 779, 783–84 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (applying the 
geographic approach); Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1090 (W.D. Wash. 
2000) (refusing to apply Tinker because the student’s speech was “entirely outside of the school’s 
supervision or control”); J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 865 (Pa. 2002) 
(applying the geographic approach); Clay Calvert, Off-Campus Speech, On-Campus Punishment: 
Censorship of the Emerging Internet Underground, 7 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 243, 285 (2001) (argu-
ing that only when a student’s online content is physically accessed on a school-controlled computer 
by the student or through his encouragement should the Tinker material disruption test be applied); 
Aaron H. Caplan, Public School Discipline for Creating Uncensored Anonymous Internet Forums, 39 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 93, 140–42 (2003) (arguing that Tinker is inapplicable beyond the schoolhouse 
gate and simply does not apply to student’s off-campus lives); Jacob Tabor, Note, Students’ First 
Amendment Rights in the Age of the Internet: Off-Campus Cyberspeech and School Regulation, 50 
B.C. L. REV. 561, 578–79 (2009) (“If Tinker was intended to apply to all off-campus student speech, 
‘the schoolhouse gates’ would be meaningless; students would have the same free speech rights at 
home as they would at school regardless of which side of the ‘gate’ they were on.”). 
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sis.56 For example, in 2002, in Mahaffey v. Aldrich, the U.S. District Court for 
the Eastern District of Michigan applied a geographic Tinker analysis by hold-
ing that a student who created a satirical webpage off campus could not be 
punished by his school.57 The court reasoned that Tinker dealt with activities 
that occurred on school property and that, “the evidence simply [did] not estab-
lish that any of the complained of conduct occurred on [school] property.”58  
Also in 2002, in J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area School District, the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania applied a similar geographic analysis to a stu-
dent-created website, but held in favor of the school.59 The court observed that 
although the disputed site was created off campus, its student creator accessed 
the site at school and showed it to fellow students at school.60 Those facts, the 
court concluded, created a sufficient nexus between the site and the school’s 
campus for it to be considered on-campus speech under Tinker.61 
By contrast, foreseeing the potential for remote speech to substantially 
disrupt activities on school grounds, some courts have engaged in a simple 
“impact” analysis, which applies the material disruption test of Tinker without 
regard to the origin of the speech.62 This approach, which many scholars also 
advocate, focuses on how students’ online activities affect the school commu-
nity rather than on whether that speech had a sufficient nexus to school 
grounds.63 For example, in 1998, in Beussink v. Woodland R-IV School Dis-
trict, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri enjoined a 
high school from suspending a student for creating a web page on his home 
                                                                                                                           
 56 Heidlage, supra note 50, at 580; see also supra note 33 and accompanying text (discussing 
Tinker’s “schoolhouse gate”). 
 57 See 236 F. Supp. 2d at 783–84. 
 58 Id. 
 59 See 807 A.2d at 865. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
 62 See, e.g., Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 
2007) (applying the impact approach); Killion v. Franklin Reg’l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 455 
(W.D. Pa. 2001) (same); Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1180 (E.D. Mo. 
1998) (applying Tinker without discussing academic nexus); see also Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., Gran-
ville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1052 n.17 (2d Cir. 1979) (anticipating the potential for “remote 
speech” to incite a widespread disturbance on school grounds, even before the widespread use of the 
Internet). 
 63 Heidlage, supra note 50, at 583 (explaining the impact approach applies Tinker “without en-
gaging the threshold question that the geographical approach attempts to answer—whether at the time 
of speaking the speaker was subject to the disciplinary reach of the school”); see Christi Cassel, Note, 
Keep Out of MySpace!: Protecting Students from Unconstitutional Suspensions and Expulsions, 49 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 643, 673–74 (2007) (advocating a test that balances the First Amendment 
rights of students outside of campus with the right of schools to prevent actual material disruption on 
campus); Renee L. Servance, Comment, Cyberbullying, Cyber-Harassment, and the Conflict Between 
Schools and the First Amendment, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 1213, 1216 (arguing that where a student is 
targeted by “cyber-speech,” and that speech has a negative impact which interferes with the school’s 
“education mission,” it should be subject to regulation by the school). 
2014] Non-Curricular Student Speech, Codes of Conduct, and the First Amendment 1669 
computer that was highly critical of school administrators.64 Although the 
court found for the student in the case because there was no showing that the 
student’s conduct would materially affect the school, the court applied Tinker 
without any mention of Tinker’s potential geographic limitations.65  
Using the same approach in 2007 in Wisniewski v. Weedsport Central 
School District, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that nei-
ther the off-campus origin of a high school student’s cyberspeech nor the ex-
clusively off-campus transmission of that speech was sufficient to insulate that 
student from discipline.66 In Wisniewski, a student sent an Instant Message 
(“IM”) icon saying “Kill Mr. VanderMolen” to a friend.67 The court, applying 
Tinker, explained that it was “reasonably foreseeable” that school officials 
would become aware of the icon, which would cause a substantial disturb-
ance.68 The court concluded that the foreseeable disturbance that such a mes-
sage could cause would “permit school discipline, whether or not [the student] 
intended his IM icon to be communicated to school authorities or, if communi-
cated, to cause a substantial disruption.”69 
C. Curricular Speech in Professional Programs: Hazelwood Gains 
Traction in University Classrooms 
In the university context, the rationale behind the U.S. Supreme Court 
precedent on student free speech is often altered, weakened, or entirely inappli-
cable.70 For example, one scholar has pointed out that the traditional justifica-
                                                                                                                           
 64 30 F. Supp. 2d at 1182. The web page employed vulgar language to convey the student’s opin-
ion about various members of the school administration and invited readers to contact the school’s 
principal to voice their own opinions. Id. at 1177. The student’s site was accessed by several students on 
school grounds, and after being alerted to the page, the principal of the school suspended the student for 
ten days. Id. at 1178. 
 65 Id. at 1180. Although the court recognized that the student developed the page off campus and 
neither accessed nor promoted the page on campus, the court did not discuss the significance of those 
facts. See id. at 1178–79. Similarly, in 2001, in Killion v. Franklin Regional School District, the U.S. 
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania applied Tinker’s substantial disruption standard to 
an email message composed outside of school, a hard copy of which was later brought on campus by a 
student other than the writer. 136 F. Supp. 2d at 455. After applying Tinker, and without any discussion 
about the email’s geographic origin, the court found that no substantial disruption had occurred. Id. 
 66 See 494 F.3d at 39. The Wisniewski court cited its decision in Thomas v. Board of Education, 
Granville Center School District to support its finding that the location of conduct was immaterial in 
cases of substantial disruption. Id. (quoting Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1052 n.17). 
 67 Id. at 36. An IM icon is generally composed of a set of animated pictures and/or words sent 
over an online chat service. Id. at 35. 
 68 Id. at 39–40. 
 69 Id. at 40. Significantly, this statement allows for the expansive regulation of student speech. 
Heidlage, supra note 50, at 587. Although in a subsequent off-campus speech case the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit stated that it was acutely aware of the need to restrict schools to mat-
ters of legitimate pedagogical concern, it again opted to resolve the case without undergoing a thresh-
old geographic inquiry. Id. (discussing Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 48 (2d Cir. 2008)). 
 70 See McCauley, 618 F.3d at 247; Waldman, supra note 3, at 387–88. 
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tions for administrative regulation of student speech, such as the school’s role in 
teaching and monitoring ethics, fundamental values, and age-appropriateness, 
are not valid in a university setting.71 Indeed, no court has ever applied either 
Fraser or Morse to a university case.72 
Furthermore, as described by Justice William Brennan, Jr. in Keyishian v. 
Board of Regents, a university is “peculiarly the marketplace of ideas.”73 
Therefore, both scholars and courts have argued that the ability of a university 
to regulate student speech should be subject to much greater limitation and 
scrutiny than in the K-12 context.74 Although this view is not universal, it is 
clear that different attendant circumstances accompany free speech in the uni-
versity context, and courts have struggled to determine exactly how far to ex-
tend the U.S. Supreme Court’s student speech jurisprudence beyond the high 
school setting.75 
                                                                                                                           
 71 Waldman, supra note 3, at 387–88. One scholar argues that the protective justifications of 
Fraser and Hazelwood—aiming to shield students from age-inappropriate material—as well as 
Morse’s justification of aiming to shield young students from drug-related peer pressure, are all far 
less applicable to more mature post-secondary students. Id. at 387. Although Tinker’s substantial 
disruption concerns are still relevant, this scholar argues that “the larger, more diffuse nature of uni-
versity campus life” coupled with the greater maturity of post-secondary students greatly reduces the 
likelihood of any one student’s speech causing “widespread unrest.” Id. Similarly, in 2010, in 
McCauley v. University of the Virgin Islands, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
argued that the mission of a university—encouraging “inquiry and challenging a priori assump-
tions”—is different than that of a K–12 school which “prioritizes the inculcation of societal values.” 
618 F.3d at 243. Furthermore, the McCauley court argued that elements of previous U.S. Supreme 
Court frameworks, such as Tinker’s “schoolhouse gate,” are less applicable in the university setting. 
Id. at 247. For example, many university students reside on campus and therefore would find them-
selves within the “schoolhouse gate” and subject to speech regulations at almost all hours of the day. 
Id. 
 72 Waldman, supra note 3, at 388. 
 73 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (internal quotations omitted). 
 74 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (arguing that that in American universi-
ties there exists a simple “essentiality of freedom” and that to “impose any straight jacket” upon the 
members of such institutions as they question the norms of society and seek new understanding would 
“imperil the future of our Nation”); McCauley, 618 F.3d at 247 (arguing that in view of the undenia-
bly different pedagogical missions of public universities and public elementary and high schools as 
well as the ranging “emotional maturity” of the respective audiences in those settings, any application 
of U.S. Supreme Court free speech doctrine to the university setting “should be scrutinized carefully, 
with an emphasis on the underlying reasoning of the rule to be applied”); Waldman, supra note 3, at 
387–88 (arguing that both the protective and educational rationales behind the U.S. Supreme Court 
student speech precedent “counsel toward limited application” of that precedent and asserting that it 
“makes perfect sense” that university students receive “greater First Amendment protection than do 
their K-12 counterparts”). 
 75 See Waldman, supra note 3, at 385 n.16 (comparing U.S. Circuit Court cases extending Hazel-
wood or declining to do so); see also Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 734 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Nor, it is 
worth adding, does the university setting invariably mean that educators have less discretion over their 
curriculum and class-related speech. It may be true that university students can handle more mature 
themes, but it is also true that they are not forced to be there, something that cannot be said about most 
students at public high schools.”). 
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In the context of curricular student speech, however, some circuits have 
applied Hazelwood in the university setting.76 Notably, courts have employed 
the rule and rationale of Hazelwood’s pedagogical concern standard in several 
cases to regulate students’ curricular speech—or lack thereof—in the context 
of professional training programs.77 For example, in 2012 in Ward v. Polite, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit applied the “pedagogical concern” 
standard of Hazelwood to a counseling student’s curricular speech, reasoning 
that no true “stop-go” distinction exists between student speech at the high 
school and university levels.78 In Polite, the administration at Eastern Michi-
gan University expelled a student from a graduate-level counseling program 
for refusing to counsel a same-sex client due to the student’s Christian faith.79 
Only four courses short of a degree, the student enrolled in her required practi-
cum, but when asked to counsel a same-sex client, she requested that her su-
pervisor either refer the client or permit her to begin counseling with the un-
derstanding that a referral could be made if she was asked to affirm the rela-
tionship.80 The student’s supervisor referred the client, but the university 
commenced disciplinary action against the student alleging that she had violat-
ed two provisions of the American Counseling Association (“ACA”) Code of 
Ethics, violated the university’s blanket ban on counseling referrals, and con-
travened the university’s strong policy on value-affirmation.81 The Sixth Cir-
cuit, however, held against the university.82 The court explained that the stu-
dent had not in fact violated any ACA provision and the university had failed 
to demonstrate any evidence of a no-referrals policy in existence at the time 
the student was expelled.83 
                                                                                                                           
 76 Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731, 735 (7th Cir. 2005) (extending Hazelwood to the university 
setting and citing similar cases from the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits with approval); Axson–Flynn v. 
Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1293 (10th Cir. 2004) (applying Hazelwood to evaluate curricular student 
speech at a university); see Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1074 (11th Cir. 1991) (applying Hazel-
wood to permit the regulation of certain curricular speech in a university classroom). 
 77 See Polite, 667 F.3d at 734; Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 664 F.3d 865, 876 (11th Cir. 2011); 
Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1293; Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 952 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 78 Polite, 667 F.3d at 733–34 (explaining that the use of the Hazelwood standard in the university 
context would allow for schools and courts to account for the “level of maturity” of university students). 
 79 See id. at 729–30. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. at 731. 
 82 Id. at 738. The court concluded that a reasonable jury could find that the university had expelled 
the student for her religious beliefs rather than for legitimate pedagogical concerns. Id. The holding 
mirrored the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, where a Mormon student was en-
couraged to withdraw from the University of Utah’s Actor Training Program after refusing to use the 
word “fuck” or take the Lord’s name in vain. 356 F.3d at 1280. The University argued that performing 
the exercises as written was an important part of the curriculum and that they were chosen specifically 
to prepare students for professional careers by enhancing their “true acting” skills. See id. at 1291. The 
court held, however, that in light of the facts of the case, a jury should determine if the school’s stated 
pedagogical concern was not instead a pretext for religious discrimination. Id. at 1293. 
 83 Polite, 667 F.3d at 736. 
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Some universities have been more successful in asserting Hazelwood’s 
pedagogical concern standard to justify the restriction of student speech.84 In 
2011, in Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit held that Augusta State University (“ASU”) had a legitimate pedagogi-
cal concern in teaching students in its Counselor Education Program to comply 
with the ACA Code of Ethics.85 In Keeton, a student was seeking her master’s 
degree in school counseling from ASU, but after her first year was asked to 
complete a “remediation plan” before entering the program’s clinical practi-
cum.86 ASU assigned the remediation plan after determining that the student 
had expressed an intent to violate “several provisions” of the ACA Code of 
Ethics, which prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation.87 Applying 
Hazelwood, the court concluded that the school’s interest in teaching students 
to comply with the ACA Code of Ethics was in fact a legitimate pedagogical 
concern in the context of a student practicum.88 
Similarly, in 2002, in Brown v. Li, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit ruled that the University of California at Santa Barbara could restrict a 
master’s degree candidate from filing his dissertation because of its unprofes-
sional content.89 The court explicitly held that Hazelwood’s legitimate peda-
gogical concern standard was the “appropriate” standard in cases of “curricu-
lar speech.”90 In applying Hazelwood, the court concluded that the university’s 
actions against the student were related to the legitimate pedagogical objective 
of “teaching [the] Plaintiff the proper format for a scientific paper,” and noted 
that the student was even given instructions requiring that he “comply with 
[the] professional standards governing his discipline.”91 
                                                                                                                           
 84 See Keeton, 664 F.3d at 876 (extending Hazelwood to the university setting); Brown, 308 F.3d 
at 952 (same). 
 85 Keeton, 664 F.3d at 876. 
 86 Id. at 867. The student had previously expressed her plans to convert homosexual clients to 
heterosexuality, to inform homosexual clients that such behavior was morally wrong, and to tell cli-
ents that it was “not okay to be gay.” Id. at 868. 
 87 Id. at 869. The student withdrew claiming that she would be unable to complete the universi-
ty’s remediation plan and that the actions of the school violated her free speech rights. Id. at 871. 
 88 Id. at 876 (reasoning that ASU must follow the ACA’s Code of Ethics for accreditation purpos-
es and that “the entire mission of its counseling program is to produce ethical and effective counselors 
in accordance with the professional requirements of the ACA”). 
 89 Brown, 308 F.3d at 955. The content in question was a “‘Disacknowledgements’ section” that 
the student attempted to add to his dissertation that included “special Fuck You’s” to various staff, 
school officials, and even a former California Governor. Id. at 943. 
 90 Id. at 949. 
 91 Id. at 952. 
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D. Beyond the Campus Gates: Tatro Permits the Regulation of Non-
curricular Student Speech in a Professional Program 
The professional speech cases discussed in Section C of this Part allowed 
for a relatively straightforward application of Hazelwood.92 Each occurred in a 
setting that the courts could fairly characterize as “curricular” and, therefore, 
as within the academic purview of university regulation.93 Where a non-
curricular violation of professional standards occurs through social media in a 
university setting, however, the complications of cyberspeech clash with the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s minimal guidance on the applicability of its secondary 
school precedent to the university setting.94 
In Tatro, the Minnesota Supreme Court decided a case involving a non-
curricular violation of professional ethics and course rules that occurred 
through social media.95 In Tatro, the plaintiff was a junior enrolled in a Mortu-
ary Science Program for undergraduate upperclassmen at the University of 
Minnesota.96 The required laboratory courses in the program used human ca-
davers supplied through the Anatomy Bequest Program by individual donors to 
the University.97 In order to participate in the program, students were required 
to sign a form acknowledging and agreeing to follow the rules of the Anatomy 
Bequest Program as well as additional lab rules designed to “promote respect 
for the cadaver.”98 These rules allowed some discreet conversation outside the 
lab but prohibited “blogging” about the lab or dissection.99 
During the plaintiff’s lab semester, the director of the Mortuary Science 
Program became aware of several posts the plaintiff had made to her Facebook 
page regarding the anatomy lab and dissection.100 The plaintiff’s posts refer-
enced playing with a cadaver, the “cathartic” nature of embalming, and includ-
ed some “violent satirical fantasy.”101 In reaction to the potential violence in 
                                                                                                                           
 92 See supra notes 70–91 and accompanying text. 
 93 See supra notes 70–91 and accompanying text. 
 94 See infra notes 95–105 and accompanying text. 
 95 Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 511. 
 96 Id. The court noted that the primary “purpose” of the program was to “prepare students to be 
licensed funeral directors and morticians.” Id. at 511–12. 
 97 Id. at 512. 
 98 Id. The rules also served to “educate students concerning the professional and ethical responsi-
bilities of the funeral service profession, and to maintain the viability of the Anatomy Bequest Pro-
gram.” Id. at 516–17. Adherence to such rules was required for accreditation of the program. Id. at 
517. 
 99 Id. at 512. The court noted that the professor had explained to the students that “blogging” was 
intended to be defined broadly and covered Facebook and Twitter. Id. 
 100 Id. It is worth noting that at the time of her posts, “Tatro’s Facebook privacy settings allowed 
her ‘friends’ and ‘friends of friends’ to see what she had posted. Tatro had ‘hundreds’ of Facebook 
friends.” Id. 
 101 Id. at 512–513. One such post read: “Amanda Beth Tatro is looking forward to Monday’s 
embalming therapy as well as a rumored opportunity to aspirate. Give me room, lots of aggression to 
be taken out with a trocar.” Id. at 512. 
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her posts, the director of the program told the student to “stay away” from the 
department while the matter was investigated.102 
The student testified at her disciplinary hearing that she had intended her 
posts to be read only by “friends and family who would understand her sar-
casm, morbid sense of humor, and references to popular movies and songs.”103 
Nevertheless, the university imposed a number sanctions against her because 
she had violated laboratory rules designed to “set standards for behavior” that 
students would “carry into the profession.”104 Despite the plaintiff’s claim that 
the university violated her constitutional right to free speech because her Face-
book posts did not identify or threaten anyone, the court held that she did not 
have the right to “engage in unprofessional and unethical conduct” without 
academic consequences.105 
II. THE JURISPRUDENCE PUZZLE: DOES EXISTING U.S. SUPREME COURT 
PRECEDENT PERMIT PROFESSIONAL PROGRAMS TO  
RESTRICT CERTAIN NON-CURRICULAR SPEECH? 
As a general rule, public universities cannot restrict the non-curricular so-
cial media speech of students, which falls beyond the reach of the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s student speech standards and would otherwise be protected out-
side of the university context.106 That is not to say that such regulation does not 
occur; in fact, according to a recent survey done by the Foundation for Indi-
vidual Rights in Education (FIRE) for the 2009-2010 school year, over two-
thirds of the 390 public universities they examined had “speech codes” that 
                                                                                                                           
 102 Id. at 513. Believing herself suspended, Tatro reported her story to the local media and appeared 
on local television, spurring a number of concerned responses from donor families and the general public 
regarding Tatro’s “lack of professionalism” and the steps the university would take to prevent such an 
event in the future. Id. Tatro was subsequently allowed to complete the course and received a “C+,” but 
was informed that she was being investigated for her violation of the University’s Student Conduct Code. 
Id. 
 103 Id. at 514. 
 104 Id. The University mandated that (1) Tatro’s lab grade be changed to an F; (2) Tatro complete 
a course in clinical ethics; (3) Tatro compose a letter to a Mortuary professor addressing respect in the 
program and profession; (4) Tatro undergo a psychiatric evaluation and comply with any recommen-
dations made; and (5) Tatro be placed on probation for the remainder of her undergraduate career. Id. 
at 514–15. 
 105 Id. at 524. The court noted that Minnesota’s right to free speech was “coextensive” with feder-
al law, and thus the court relied on federal doctrine in deciding the case. See id. at 516. 
 106 See Dambrot v. Cent. Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177, 1180 (6th Cir. 1995) (striking down a uni-
versity discriminatory harassment policy for violating the First Amendment); Roberts v. Haragan, 346 
F. Supp. 2d 853, 872 (N.D. Tex. 2004) (explaining that beyond the University’s nonpublic forum 
areas, students have a right to the freedom of expression protected by the First Amendment); Creeley 
& Lukianoff, supra note 3, at 335 (pointing to over twenty years of precedent holding that public 
university regulation of student speech, which would be constitutionally protected outside of the uni-
versity setting, is unconstitutional). 
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were unconstitutional.107 These code violations are especially puzzling because 
the university system in the United States is regarded as a unique marketplace 
of ideas with an emphasis on free exchange and a lack of government interfer-
ence.108 
When a student in a professional program is punished for speaking in vio-
lation of an established code of ethics, however, the circumstances may fall 
within a niche where even non-curricular speech in the university setting may 
be constitutionally restricted.109 Part A of this Section examines the applicabil-
ity of the 1988 U.S. Supreme Court case Hazelwood School District v. 
Kuhlmeier to non-curricular speech in professional programs.110 Part B then 
explores how the 1969 U.S. Supreme Court case Tinker v. Des Moines Inde-
pendent Community School District could be applied to the same set of cir-
cumstances.111 Finally, Part C discusses and analyzes the approach taken in 
2012 by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Tatro v. University of Minnesota.112 
A. Extending Hazelwood to Non-Curricular Speech  
in Professional Programs 
One way that courts could theoretically allow professional programs to 
regulate non-curricular student speech is by extending the Hazelwood standard 
to violations of professional ethics.113 To support such an extension, it is in-
structive to consider the policies behind cases where curricular speech has 
                                                                                                                           
 107 Creeley & Lukianoff, supra note 3, at 334; Williams, supra note 48, at 724–25. Unconstitu-
tional speech codes are simply university regulations that prohibit certain forms of student expression 
that would otherwise be constitutionally protected outside the university setting. See Creeley & Luki-
anoff, supra note 3, at 334. For example, in 2008, the University of Oklahoma informed students that 
their university e-mail accounts could not be used to “endorse or oppose a [political] candidate, in-
cluding the forwarding of political humor/commentary.” Id. at 339. The University rescinded the 
policy following a letter from FIRE. Id. at 339–40. 
 108 See Creeley & Lukianoff, supra note 3, at 333–35 (noting that despite the characterization of 
American universities as a marketplace of ideas, many college campuses remain “stubbornly hostile to 
freedom of expression and First Amendment rights”). 
 109 See Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509, 520–21 (Minn. 2012) (noting that both parties 
agreed that the University could regulate “off-campus conduct that violate[s] specific professional 
obligations,” namely “established professional conduct standards”); Waldman, supra note 3, at 388 
(arguing that although university students generally receive greater First Amendment protections, that 
generalization breaks down both “factually [and] normatively” when a university student violates a 
professional code of conduct). 
 110 See infra notes 113–131 and accompanying text. 
 111 See infra notes 132–145 and accompanying text. 
 112 See infra notes 146–159 and accompanying text. 
 113 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988) (allowing regulation where 
an activity is “designed to impart particular knowledge of skills,” whether or not occurring in the 
classroom, for speech that is under the auspices of the university); Waldman, supra note 3, at 388 
(arguing that the rationale and rule of Hazelwood are applicable to professional programs). 
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been limited in professional programs using Hazelwood.114 For example, in 
2011, in Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit upheld sanctions against a professional student for curricular 
speech that would have allegedly violated the American Counseling Associa-
tion (“ACA”) Code of Ethics.115 The Keeton court relied on Hazelwood to hold 
that a university had a legitimate pedagogical concern in ensuring that the stu-
dents in its counseling program did not violate the professional conduct stand-
ards to which they would one day be required to professionally adhere.116 The 
court noted that this was both because “the entire mission” of the school’s pro-
gram was “to produce ethical and effective counselors” and because adherence 
was necessary to protect the school’s accreditation.117 
The Hazelwood standard further requires, however, that a student’s 
speech bear the imprimatur of the school.118 The court in Keeton reasoned that 
this standard was satisfied because the clinical practicum was a “school-
sponsored” activity designed to impart “particular knowledge” upon students, 
which the general public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of 
the school.119 Accordingly, the imprimatur requirement was satisfied because 
the clinic, as a forum, was sufficiently curricular to permit speech regulation 
under the policy in Hazelwood.120 
The legitimate pedagogical concerns that are present in a non-curricular 
speech case such as Tatro are often exactly the same as the pedagogical con-
cerns that are present in a curricular speech case such as Keeton.121 Neither the 
location nor the medium of a student’s speech alters the university’s concern in 
                                                                                                                           
 114 See, e.g., Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 734 (6th Cir. 2012) (applying Hazelwood to curricular 
speech in a university clinical setting); Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 664 F.3d 865, 875 (11th Cir. 2011) 
(applying Hazelwood to limit curricular speech in a university clinical setting); Bishop v. Aronov, 926 
F.2d 1066, 1074 (11th Cir. 1991) (same). 
 115 664 F.3d at 868 (upholding sanctions where a counseling student planned to inform clients 
that it was “not okay to be gay”); see supra notes 85–88 and accompanying text (discussing Keeton in 
greater detail). The U.S. Supreme Court has held that a government actor need not “allow events to 
unfold to the extent that the disruption . . . is manifest before taking action.” Connick v. Myers, 461 
U.S. 138, 152 (1983). 
 116 Keeton, 664 F.3d at 876; see Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271. 
 117 Keeton, 664 F.3d at 876. 
 118 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271 (holding that schools have authority over “activities that students, 
parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school”).  
 119 Keeton, 664 F.3d at 875. In Hazelwood, the Court specified that school sponsored expressive 
activities “may fairly be characterized as part of the school curriculum, whether or not they occur in a 
traditional classroom setting, so long as they are supervised . . . and designed to impart particular 
knowledge . . . .” Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271. 
 120 Keeton, 664 F.3d at 875. 
 121 See Keeton, 664 F.3d at 876 (explaining that the school had a legitimate pedagogical concern 
in teaching students to adhere to the ACA Code of Ethics as required for school accreditation); Tatro, 
816 N.W.2d at 516–17 (explaining the two pedagogical concerns of the university: teaching students 
the ethics of the funeral service profession while maintaining the program through accreditation and 
the Anatomy Bequest Program). 
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ensuring the fitness of its students for their professions or in ensuring the con-
tinued viability of its programs.122 In Tatro, for example, despite the fact that 
speech occurred off campus through social media, it violated the professional 
code to which the student had agreed to adhere.123 The program rules in Tatro 
existed, like those in Keeton, both to educate students on the “professional and 
ethical responsibilities” of their professions and to preserve the “viability” of 
the program.124 
The problem, however, is that despite this legitimate pedagogical concern, 
a student’s non-curricular social media post is unlikely to reflect the imprima-
tur of the school as that concept is currently construed.125 The requirement that 
a student’s actions bear the imprimatur of the school—the second part of the 
Hazelwood standard—is satisfied in cases such as Keeton only because student 
speech has occurred in a “curricular” setting as defined by Hazelwood.126 
On the other hand, the policy in Hazelwood exists to allow schools to 
control their own curricula and to disassociate from student speech that might 
appear to be school sanctioned.127 The case of non-curricular student speech 
that violates a professional code of conduct is unique because it can have an 
effect on the school’s curriculum through the school’s accreditation require-
                                                                                                                           
 122 See Keeton, 664 F.3d at 876; Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 516–17. 
 123 Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 520–21. 
 124 See Keeton, 664 F.3d at 876; Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 516–17. 
 125 See Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 518 (suggesting that evenly largely public social media posts do not 
bear the imprimatur of a university); James M. Patrick, Comment, The Civility-Police: The Rising 
Need to Balance Students’ Rights to Off-Campus Internet Speech Against the School’s Compelling 
Interests, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 855, 889 (2010) (suggesting that a student webpage would need to be 
accompanied by something like the school district’s official emblem to fall under Hazelwood). Alt-
hough most instances of social media speech generated off campus fall beyond the reach of Hazel-
wood, at least one scholar has argued that, in the case of professional student speech that violates an 
established code of ethics, the imprimatur standard would in fact be satisfied. Waldman, supra note 3, 
at 388. This policy has been called the “certification rationale.” Id. In such a case, when granting a 
student a professional degree, arguably a university implicitly “certifies” that student as fit to practice 
in that profession. Id. With that certification, that student then bears the imprimatur of the school. Id. 
at 393. This rationale can be read into cases such as Keeton and Polite where the students would have 
received counseling degrees certifying them to practice as professional counselors. See Polite, 667 
F.3d at 734–35; Keeton, 664 F.3d at 875; Waldman, supra note 3, at 388. If a university is unable to 
take actions to restrict such speech, even speech occurring outside the curricular setting, the university 
will be forced to certify students that it may not in fact deem fit to bear its imprimatur. Waldman, 
supra note 3, at 388. 
 126 See Keeton, 664 F.3d at 875 (discussing a university counseling student enrolled in a super-
vised clinical practicum designed to impart specific vocational skills to students); see also Polite, 667 
F.3d at 734–35 (presenting similar facts). The Court in Hazelwood considered “curricular” those ac-
tivities that, whether occurring in a traditional classroom setting or not, were school-sponsored ex-
pressive activities supervised by the faculty and designed to impart particular knowledge or skills to 
student participants or audiences. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271. 
 127 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271 (“Educators are entitled to exercise greater control over [curricu-
lar activities] to assure that participants learn whatever lessons the activity is designed to teach . . . and 
that the views of the individual speaker are not erroneously attributed to the school.”). 
1678 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 55:1659 
ments.128 In these limited professional cases, the student in some sense con-
structively speaks for the school because the school may ultimately be held 
responsible for that speech by the accreditation board.129 The difference be-
tween this situation and a traditional imprimatur case under Hazelwood is that 
the school bears the burden of the student’s speech through its accreditation 
requirements rather than through the interpretation of the general public.130 
Although the distinction between these cases has prevented such non-
curricular speech from falling within the actual bounds of Hazelwood’s rule, 
the similarities between them suggest that Hazelwood’s rationale could indeed 
be used to support the restriction of non-curricular speech in certain circum-
stances.131 
B. Extending Tinker to Non-Curricular Speech in Professional Programs 
Courts could also regulate non-curricular violations of professional codes 
of conduct by using the standard articulated in Tinker.132 In dealing with non-
curricular Internet speech cases to date, courts have almost exclusively applied 
Tinker.133 
Although some courts have utilized a “geographic” approach, which first 
asks if a sufficient nexus exists between student speech and the school campus, 
                                                                                                                           
 128 See Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 516–17 (noting that the academic program rules served both to 
“maintain the viability of the Anatomy Bequest Program” and to meet “accreditation standards”). 
 129 Id. 
 130 Compare Keeton, 664 F.3d at 875 (explaining that student speech in a counseling practicum 
could be interpreted by the general public to reflect the imprimatur of the school), with Tatro, 816 
N.W.2d at 516–17 (implying that student violations of rules established by the University of Minneso-
ta, which narrowly prohibited certain social media use in connection with a forensics lab, could ad-
versely affect the accreditation of the program). The Keeton court also noted the potential for the ad-
verse impact student speech could have on the school’s accreditation standards, but did not need to go 
further because it concluded that the student’s practicum was curricular and thus satisfied the Hazel-
wood standard. Keeton, 664 F.3d at 870. 
 131 See Keeton, 664 F.3d at 875; Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 516–17. 
 132 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513–14 (1969) (permitting 
the regulation of student speech that causes or might reasonably be forecast to cause “substantial dis-
ruption of or material interference with school activities”). 
 133 See Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(applying Tinker to student cyberspeech); J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. 
Supp. 2d 1094, 1107 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (observing that “the majority of courts will apply Tinker where 
speech originating off campus is brought to school or to the attention of school authorities”); 
Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 412 F. Supp. 2d 502, 507 (W.D. Pa. 2006) (applying Tinker to 
student cyberspeech); Mahaffey v. Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d 779, 783–84 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (same); 
Killion v. Franklin Reg’l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 455 (W.D. Pa. 2001) (same); Emmett v. 
Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1090 (W.D. Wash. 2000) (same); Beussink v. Wood-
land R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1180 (E.D. Mo. 1998) (same); J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethle-
hem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 865 (Pa. 2002) (same); see also Williams, supra note 48, at 719 
(“[A]lmost every student Internet speech case is analyzed under Tinker.”). 
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the majority of courts favor an “impact” test.134 These courts have completely 
disregarded this threshold geographic inquiry and have instead moved imme-
diately to Tinker’s substantial disruption test.135 Courts in such cases have held 
that it is not whether the student is in or out of school, but how the student’s 
actions affect the school community that should determine the applicability of 
student speech regulations.136 
This suggests that many courts do not feel that a school’s academic pur-
view ceases at the schoolhouse gate—at least in some situations that implicate 
important school functions.137 The problem with this expansive rule, however, 
is that it may give schools the power to reach too far into the personal lives of 
students.138 For example, the court in Tatro expressly acknowledged the con-
cern that a broad rule would “allow a public university to regulate a student’s 
personal expression at any time, at any place, for any claimed curriculum-
based reason.”139 Despite this concern, it appears that at least some courts are 
willing to extend this rule so long as the student activity affects a “matter of 
legitimate concern to the school community.”140 
                                                                                                                           
 134 See, e.g., Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 39 (applying the impact approach); Killion, 136 F. Supp. 2d 
at 455 (same); Beussink, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 1180 (same); Calvoz et al., supra note 19, at 382 (asserting 
that courts increasingly apply the impact test); see also Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506 (supplying the basis 
for geographic and impact frameworks by implying that at least some differentiation of student speech 
rights occurs “at the schoolhouse gate”); supra, notes 55–69 and accompanying text (discussing the 
geographic and impact approaches of Tinker). 
 135 See Killion, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 455 (“The overwhelming weight of authority has analyzed 
student speech (whether on or off campus) in accordance with Tinker.”); Beussink, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 
1180 (applying Tinker without discussing an academic nexus); Heidlage, supra note 50, at 583–87 
(explaining that many courts have moved away from the “hard-line geographical approach” by ad-
dressing only substantial disruption). 
 136 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513 (stating that “conduct by the student, in class or out of it . . . [is] 
not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech”); Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 39 
(recognizing that because off-campus conduct can “create a foreseeable risk of substantial disruption 
within a school,” a student is not insulated from academic discipline for acts committed outside of 
school); Killion, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 455 (focusing on the absence of disruption caused by off-campus 
student cyberspeech rather than its location). 
 137 See, e.g., Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 40 (“The fact that . . . [the] creation and transmission of the 
IM icon occurred away from school property does not necessarily insulate [the student] from school 
discipline.”); Killion, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 455 (implying that the regulation of off-campus student cy-
berspeech would not violate First Amendment rights in the face of substantial disruption); Beussink, 
30 F. Supp. 2d at 1180 (declining to permit discipline only because no reasonable fear of substantial 
disruption existed). 
 138 See Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 521 (noting that a broad rule would allow a school to “impermissi-
bly reach into a university student’s personal life outside of and unrelated to the program”); Heidlage, 
supra note 50, at 587 (“Under [the Wisniewski] approach, it is unclear what, if any, speech is beyond 
the reach of school officials.”). 
 139 Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 521. 
 140 Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 48 (2d Cir. 2008); see Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 40; Killion, 
136 F. Supp. 2d at 455; supra notes 62–69 and accompanying text (discussing the impact approach to 
Tinker). 
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A violation of program rules in a professional program could trigger a 
number of academic concerns, which might be construed as a foreseeable ma-
terial disruption under Tinker.141 Here again, the academic concerns of a uni-
versity are not necessarily altered simply because speech occurs in a non-
curricular setting.142 Whether committed on or off campus, a violation of es-
tablished program rules would both affect the student’s compliance with pro-
fessional ethics and endanger the viability of the program.143 For example, in 
an extreme incident from a New York medical school, a student posted a pic-
ture of a human cadaver on Facebook, leading state health officials to consider 
sanctions against the school.144 Non-curricular speech such as this, which 
threatens the viability of a program, could easily be construed as a foreseeable 
material disturbance and permissibly regulated under Tinker.145 
C. Tatro’s Take: Creating New Precedent for Non-Curricular Speech  
in Professional Programs 
Instead of permitting the regulation of non-curricular student speech in 
professional programs by stretching the frameworks of Tinker and Hazelwood, 
courts could alternatively develop a new legal framework to address that par-
                                                                                                                           
 141 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514 (permitting schools to regulate foreseeable substantial disruption 
or interference to school activities). 
 142 See Thomas v. Bd. of Ed., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1058 (2d Cir. 1979) 
(“[T]erritoriality is not necessarily a useful concept in determining the limit of [school administra-
tors’] authority.”); see also Keeton, 664 F.3d at 869 (discussing pedagogical concerns arising from a 
student’s curricular speech); Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 516–17 (discussing the same pedagogical concerns 
arising from a student’s non-curricular speech). 
 143 See Keeton, 664 F.3d at 869 (implying that a student’s speech in a curricular counseling 
practicum could adversely affect the program’s accreditation); Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 516–17 (imply-
ing that non-curricular student speech that violated both program rules and a professional code of 
conduct in a mortuary science program could adversely affect the accreditation of the professional 
program). 
 144 See Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 521 (citing the incident); Josh Einiger, Cadaver Photo Comes Back 
to Haunt Resident, ABC, Feb. 2, 2010, http://abclocal.go.com/story?section=news/local&id=7253275, 
available at http://perma.cc/6VSJ-JH38 (discussing the same incident); see also Megan Gibson, Nurs-
ing Students Expelled for Posting Photo of a Placenta on Facebook, TIME, Jan. 4, 2011, http://
newsfeed.time.com/2011/01/04/nursing-students-expelled-for-posting-photo-of-a-placenta-on-face
book/, archived at http://perma.cc/63HL-HFQ3 (reporting a similar incident in which four students 
were suspended from a nursing program for posting a photo of themselves posing with a human pla-
centa on Facebook). 
 145 See Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 519–20 (implying that Tinker could be used to regulate the speech at 
issue in the case, but declining to do so). The Tatro court explained that the University enacted its 
program rules not only for accreditation purposes, but also because the Anatomy Bequest Program 
relied upon “maintaining the trust of the individuals who donate their bodies” to the program. Id. at 
523. After the student elected to disseminate her posts widely through the news media, the University 
received a number of calls from donor families and the public about the student’s “poor judgment and 
lack of professionalism.” Id. Consequently, the student’s subsequent comments threatened not only 
the Mortuary Science Program in the opinion of the court, but all of the departments at the University 
of Minnesota that rely on donated human cadavers to further research and education. Id. at 524. 
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ticular issue.146 The latter approach is the one that the Minnesota Supreme 
Court pursued in Tatro by forging a new standard that was narrowly tailored to 
the ethical rules it sought to protect.147 
In Tatro, the Minnesota Supreme Court declined to apply Tinker or Ha-
zelwood.148 First, although the court recognized that Hazelwood had been con-
strued to extend far beyond the classroom in the high school setting, it declined 
to support such an extension of authority to universities.149 The court reasoned 
that Hazelwood applies only to student speech that could be perceived as 
school sanctioned and concluded that the Facebook posts at issue simply did 
not give rise to such an imprimatur situation.150 
The court also noted that Tinker has often been applied in secondary 
school cyberspeech cases, including cases where speech originated off cam-
pus.151 The court reasoned, however, that the “driving force” behind the stu-
dent’s sanction was not the fear of a substantial disruption on campus or in her 
program, but that her posts violated the established rules of academic con-
duct.152 The court concluded, therefore, that the Tinker standard simply “[did] 
not fit the purposes of [the student’s] sanctions.”153 
Instead, the Tatro court drew from the policy and language of the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Tinker, which stated that courts must consider “the special 
characteristics of the school environment.”154 In Tatro, the program was a 
“professional program that train[ed] students to be funeral directors and morti-
cians.”155 In the context of such a program, it was essential that the university 
                                                                                                                           
 146 See supra notes 113–145 and accompanying text. In addition to Tinker and Hazelwood, the 
non-curricular speech of professional students may also indirectly implicate the policy rationale of 
Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser. See 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986). Although never previously 
applied in the university setting, the Court in Fraser noted the important role that primary and second-
ary schools play in inculcating certain morals, habits, and values into K–12 students. See id. This 
same logic could ostensibly apply to professional programs, which strive to produce ethical and effec-
tive members of a given profession in accordance with that profession’s established code of conduct. 
See Keeton, 664 F.3d at 876; Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 516–17. 
 147 Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 516–17. 
 148 Id. at 518–20. 
 149 Id. at 518. The court held that “[a]pplying the legitimate pedagogical concerns standard to a 
professional student’s Facebook posts would give universities wide-ranging authority to constrain 
offensive or controversial Internet activity by requiring only that a school’s actions be ‘reasonably 
related’ to ‘legitimate pedagogical concerns.’” Id. 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. (“[W]e recognize that courts often have applied the Tinker substantial disruption standard 
. . . to the regulation of student speech over the Internet.”). 
 152 Id. at 520 (noting that the rules required “respect, discretion, and confidentiality in connection 
with work on human cadavers”). 
 153 Id. at 519–20. 
 154 Id. at 520 (“In deciding the constitutional rights of students, the Supreme Court has explained 
that the mode of analysis set forth in Tinker is not absolute and that courts must consider the special 
characteristics of the school environment.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 155 Id. 
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be entitled to teach professional norms through the enforcement of “reasonable 
course standards.”156 In light of these facts, the court held that “a university 
does not violate the free speech rights of a student enrolled in a professional 
program when the university imposes sanctions for Facebook posts that violate 
academic program rules that are narrowly tailored and directly related to estab-
lished professional conduct standards.”157 Furthermore, the court held that the 
plaintiff did not have the right under the First Amendment to “engage in unpro-
fessional and unethical conduct” without academic consequences.158 
III. ADOPTING TATRO: ESTABLISHING A CAREFULLY CONFINED 
FRAMEWORK FOR REGULATING NON-CURRICULAR  
PROFESSIONAL STUDENT SPEECH 
Given the exceptional First Amendment concerns that accompany the regu-
lation of non-curricular student speech in professional programs, the U.S. Su-
preme Court should adopt a new and particularized standard that balances the 
rights of students with the needs of universities and the ethical constraints of the 
professions.159 Section A of this Part argues that the U.S. Supreme Court should 
reject the antiquated notion that speech regulation must be limited by the origi-
nation or access locale of student speech and should instead be responsive to the 
prevalence of virtual communication by focusing on the ultimate effects of that 
speech.160 Section B asserts that the extension of either the 1988 U.S. Supreme 
Court standard from Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier or the 1969 U.S. 
                                                                                                                           
 156 Id. 
 157 Id. at 521; see also United States v. Crandon 173 F.3d 122, 128 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that a 
special condition placed upon defendant was a permissible restriction upon his First Amendment 
rights because the condition was “narrowly tailored and . . . directly related to” a legitimate govern-
ment interest). In applying this standard, the court in Tatro concluded that the university’s program rules 
prohibiting “blogging” were directly related to the established professional conduct standard codified by 
Minnesota law, which requires mortuary science professionals to treat human cadavers with “dignity and 
respect.” Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 522–23. Furthermore, the court concluded that the course rules—
allowing “‘respectful and discreet’ conversational language of cadaver dissection outside the laboratory, 
but prohibiting blogging about cadaver dissection or the anatomy lab”—were sufficiently narrowly tai-
lored to satisfy its new test. Id. at 523. 
 158 Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 524; see supra note 104 and accompanying text (discussing the sanc-
tions imposed upon student in Tatro). 
159 See Patrick, supra note 125, at 892 (“[I]f schools are allowed to regulate off-campus speech, a 
test needs to be implemented that properly balances the interests of all parties involved.”); Jeffrey C. 
Sun et al., A (Virtual) Land of Confusion with College Students’ Online Speech: Introducing the Cur-
ricular Nexus Test, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 49, 93 (2013) (advocating for a standard that would permit 
“a program to take action on academic grounds for out-of-class student speech with an appropriate 
curricular nexus, such as legitimate and documented professionalism standards,” which would ade-
quately balance the interests of students, schools, and the professions); see also Tatro v. Univ. of 
Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509, 521–22 (Minn. 2012) (discussing the adoption of a new test, designed to 
give credence to established professional ethics, the academic needs of universities, and student 
speech rights). 
 160 See infra notes 163–174 and accompanying text. 
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Supreme Court standard from Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community 
School District would lead to an imprecise and overbroad law, exposing other-
wise constitutional student speech to needless and unconstitutional regulation.161 
Finally, Section C maintains that the standard articulated in 2012 by the Minne-
sota Supreme Court in Tatro v. University of Minnesota properly addresses the 
concerns arising out of such regulation and should therefore be adopted by the 
U.S. Supreme Court.162 
A. Rejecting Geographic Limitations: Virtual Communication  
Renders the Schoolhouse Gate a Relic 
In order to allow universities to regulate non-curricular student speech 
that violates professional ethics, it is necessary to focus on the effects of that 
speech rather than its origin or imprimatur.163 Potential critics of such a 
framework, such as proponents of Tinker’s “geographic” approach, might ar-
gue that before any standard may be applied to student speech, a sufficient ac-
ademic nexus must exist between the speech itself and school grounds.164 Such 
an academic nexus, however, may not always be present in non-curricular 
speech cases—meaning that the imposition of a preliminary geographic 
threshold would make it nearly impossible for schools to reach many viola-
tions of professional ethics and corresponding course rules.165 
Detractors from the geographic approach to Tinker have argued that U.S. 
Supreme Court precedent for the regulation of student speech does not neces-
                                                                                                                           
 161 See infra notes 175–185 and accompanying text. 
 162 See infra notes 186–208 and accompanying text. 
163 See Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 664 F.3d 865, 869 (11th Cir. 2011) (implying that in order to 
comply with accreditation requirements and the American Counseling Association (“ACA”) Code 
of Ethics, the university needed to regulate the plaintiff’s speech in a clinic); Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 
516–17 (suggesting that to comply with accreditation requirements and the relevant professional codes 
of conduct, the University necessarily had to regulate some of the plaintiff’s non-curricular speech 
such as blogging about a lab or cadaver dissection). 
 164 See, e.g., Mahaffey v. Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d 779, 786 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (“[R]egulation of 
Plaintiff’s speech on the website without any . . . on campus activity in the creation of the website was 
a violation of Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights.”); J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 
807 A.2d 847, 865 (Pa. 2002) (analyzing whether cyberspeech would eventually circulate on school 
property before applying Tinker); Calvert, supra note 55, at 285 (arguing that so long as student cy-
berspeech remains “outside the proverbial schoolhouse gate” students should be subject only to the 
civil and criminal justice system rather than facing school discipline); Caplan, supra note 55, at 140–
42 (arguing that Tinker necessarily limited itself to speech within the schoolhouse gate and that stu-
dents therefore have “the ordinary complement of First Amendment rights outside those gates”); 
Heidlage, supra note 50, at 580–82 (summarizing advocates of the geographic approach). 
 165 See Mahaffrey, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 784 (holding that a school could not punish a student for 
cyberspeech because “the evidence simply [did] not establish that any of the complained of conduct 
occurred on [school] property”); Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 519 n.5 (acknowledging that the court’s own 
analysis and framework did not distinguish between on-campus and off-campus Facebook posts in 
order to combat the limitations created by the “somewhat everywhere at once nature of the internet”) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
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sarily require a geographic nexus.166 Publically disseminated unethical speech, 
regardless of its medium or physical location, has the potential to damage aca-
demic programs themselves, as well as the clients, patients, or other persons 
with whom students interact.167 Therefore, a professional student who commits 
a non-curricular violation of an established code of ethics should not be able to 
escape academic discipline while his or her status as a student simultaneously 
tempers his or her professional responsibility.168 Where a university program 
places a student in the role of a professional, that university should be able to 
supervise and, where appropriate, discipline that student just as the profession 
would supervise and discipline any of its members.169 
Furthermore, a number of normative arguments may be made in favor of 
rejecting a geographic analysis in the non-curricular professional student set-
ting.170 Perhaps most importantly, instances of unethical and unprofessional be-
havior such as taking a social media photograph with a cadaver or posting pri-
vate client information online carry little to no societal value.171 Such speech is 
                                                                                                                           
 166 See, e.g., Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 
2007) (applying the impact approach); Killion v. Franklin Reg’l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 455 
(W.D. Pa. 2001) (same); Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1180 (E.D. Mo. 
1998) (applying the impact approach without discussing the relevance of geographic facts presented); 
Cassel, supra note 63, at 673–74 (advocating a test that balances the First Amendment rights of stu-
dents off campus with the right of schools to prevent actual material disruption on campus); Servance, 
supra note 63, at 1235 (arguing for an impact approach because a bright-line geographic approach 
“ignores the relationship between the speaker and the target of the speech”). 
 167 See Keeton, 664 F.3d at 869 (explaining that the plaintiff intended to recommend conversion 
therapists to gay clients and that such statements would constitute a violation of the ACA Code of 
Ethics, which the program was required to adopt in order to receive accreditation); Tatro, 816 N.W.2d 
at 523–24 (explaining that “respectful treatment of human cadavers is imperative to maintaining the 
trust of the individuals who donate their bodies to the Anatomy Bequest Program,” and that “the con-
sequences of any violation of trust caused by a student . . . would extend far beyond the Mortuary 
Science Program to other University programs that rely on donated human cadavers for their research 
and education missions”). 
 168 Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 519 n.5 (explaining that the plaintiff argued that she was not subject to 
academic discipline because her Facebook posts were generated offline, and implying further that the 
plaintiff was shielded from a degree of professional discipline as she had no Mortuary Science Li-
cense to lose). 
 169 See id. at 518 (implying that universities are required to enact course rules reflecting profes-
sional ethics to offer students the opportunity to work in a professional capacity without certification 
or license); see also Keeton, 664 F.3d at 869 (explaining that the professional program was “required 
to adopt and teach” the ACA Code of Ethics in order to offer an accredited program, thereby implying 
that the university must be free to enforce those rules). 
 170 See Waldman, supra note 3, at 388 (arguing that the assumption that high school policies 
apply less to university cases is neither factually nor normatively true in the professional program 
setting). 
 171 See Randy Cohen, When Med Students Post Patient Pictures, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 11, 2011, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/13/magazine/13FOB-Ethicist-t.html?_r=2&, archived at 
http://perma.cc/CJ83-3NF2 (arguing that when a medical student posts a potentially identifiable photo-
graph to Facebook, it is “inappropriate and unprofessional,” has the potential to damage the doctor-
patient relationship, and can dehumanize the patient); see also Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 
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not, for example, protected in the professional fields these students hope to en-
ter—indeed, professionals are often legally bound not to violate the professional 
ethics of their respective fields.172 The lack of value makes this type of speech 
similar to classes of speech that are not protected by the First Amendment in so-
ciety at large.173 With these positive and normative considerations in mind, 
courts should adopt a framework that focuses on the content of student speech—
that is, whether or not it violates the professional ethics of a student’s field—
rather than on the origin or eventual access locales of that speech.174  
B. Rejecting Hazelwood and Tinker: Frameworks too Cumbersome to 
Efficiently Regulate Non-Curricular Professional Student Speech 
If courts accept that a university may sanction a student for professionally 
unethical speech, courts must then determine which standard should guide 
schools in promulgating such regulations.175 Although Hazelwood and Tinker 
                                                                                                                           
568, 571–72 (1942) (excluding certain classes of speech from First Amendment protection because they 
have little societal value). The Chaplinsky Court explained that, “it has been well observed that such 
utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to 
truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order 
and morality.” Id. at 572.  
 172 See, e.g., Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 801 (N.D. Ohio 1965) (stat-
ing that “every patient has a right to rely upon the warranty of silence” contained in the Hippocratic 
Oath and asserting that “when a doctor breaches his duty of secrecy, he is in violation of part of his 
obligations”); In re Baska, 641 S.E.2d 533, 534–35 (Ga. 2007) (upholding plaintiff’s denial of admis-
sion to the Georgia Bar for lack of candor because plaintiff had previously lost his Vermont medical 
license before the State of Vermont Board of Medical Practice for violating the American Medical 
Association’s Code of Medical Ethics); Cincinnati Bar Ass'n v. Lacinak, 348 N.E.2d 723, 724–25 
(Ohio 1976) (disbarring an attorney permanently in the State of Ohio for several violations of the 
Code of Professional Responsibility and the Cannons of Professional Ethics). 
 173 See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571–72. In society at large, adult speech is limited only by “the 
lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, the insulting or ‘fighting’ words—those which by their 
very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.” Id. The U.S. Supreme 
Court has held that the government may render further categories of speech unprotected by demon-
strating the “inextricable connection necessary between the evil sought to be prevented and the speech 
sought to be proscribed.” United States v. Stevens, 533 F.3d 218, 236–37 (3d Cir. 2008) (Cowen, J., 
dissenting), aff’d 559 U.S. 460 (2010) (discussing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763–64 (1982)). 
In Stevens, however, the court cautioned that lower courts should “hesitate before extending the logic 
of Ferber” to create new categories of unprotected speech as the U.S. Supreme Court has done so only 
in the context of child pornography. Id. at 225. 
174 Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 519 n.5 (explaining that in order to overcome the omnipresent nature of 
the Internet, it is necessary to employ a standard that does not distinguish between on-campus and off-
campus speech). 
 175 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (authorizing the regulation 
of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as that regulation is “reasonably 
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns”); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 
503, 512–14 (1969) (authorizing the regulation of student speech that might be reasonably forecast to 
“materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school”); Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 
521 (holding that a “university does not violate the free speech rights of a student enrolled in a profes-
sional program when the university imposes sanctions for Facebook posts that violate academic pro-
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could, at least in theory, be extended into professional programs, such an ap-
proach is neither the most practical nor the most desirable way to regulate such 
a narrow issue.176  
Extending Hazelwood into the non-curricular professional program set-
ting would create confusion and stretch the Hazelwood doctrine far beyond its 
original intent.177 In order to do so, a student’s off-campus social media posting 
would need to be construed as reflecting the imprimatur of the school—or in 
other words, as “curricular.”178 Although a school’s need to protect and main-
tain the viability of its programs might conceivably support this view, the 
Court in Hazelwood sought only to permit schools to disassociate themselves 
from student speech that the public might view as being issued under the 
school’s imprimatur.179 A student’s private social media post is simply not 
speech that the public might reasonably view as being affirmatively sanctioned 
by the school.180 Therefore, although the policy of Hazelwood strongly favors 
the ability of schools to regulate certain non-curricular professional student 
speech, the letter of Hazelwood would need to be stretched nearly beyond 
recognition to support that result.181 
                                                                                                                           
gram rules that are narrowly tailored and directly related to established professional conduct stand-
ards”). 
 176 See Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 518–20 (discussing the practical limitations of Tinker and Hazel-
wood in the context of professional programs and explaining why a new standard would be both more 
useful and more appropriate). 
 177 See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271 (restricting its own application to student speech bearing the 
imprimatur of the school); Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 518 (noting the impermissibly wide-ranging authori-
ty that would be granted to schools over controversial Internet activity in professional programs if 
Hazelwood were extended). 
 178 See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271 (explaining that activities bearing the imprimatur of the 
school, and therefore within the reach of administrative regulation, “may fairly be characterized as 
part of the school curriculum, whether or not they occur in a traditional classroom setting, so long as 
they are supervised . . . and designed to impart particular knowledge”) (emphasis added); Keeton, 664 
F.3d at 875 (explaining that professional student speech in a clinical practicum could be regulated 
under Hazelwood because the practicum was “part of the school curriculum . . . supervised by faculty 
members and designed to impart particular knowledge or skills”) (internal quotations omitted) (em-
phasis added). 
 179 See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271 (explaining that a school must be free to disassociate itself 
not only from speech that would substantially interfere with the school, but also from speech that is 
“poorly written, inadequately researched, biased or prejudiced, vulgar or profane, or unsuitable for 
immature audiences” when that speech is disseminated under the school’s auspices). 
 180 See Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 518 (explaining that Hazelwood was an inappropriate standard to 
apply both because it would “give universities wide-ranging authority to constrain offensive or con-
troversial Internet activity” and because the public would simply not “reasonably perceive” the plain-
tiff’s Facebook posts as school-sponsored speech). 
 181 Id. The court in Tatro did note that “the universe of legitimate pedagogical concerns” had 
previously been stretched broadly enough to include core values such as “discipline, courtesy, and 
respect for authority” at the high school level. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (discussing Poling v. 
Murphy, 872 F.2d 757, 762 (6th Cir. 1989)). The Tatro court argued, however, that such a sweeping 
expansion was neither practical nor desirable at the university level. Id. 
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Likewise, extending Tinker to reach non-curricular professional student 
speech would both unduly stretch the reasoning of that case and, in sweeping 
broadly to include professional student speech, would subject a wide swath of 
non-professional student speech to university regulation.182 Furthermore, as the 
court in Tatro pointed out, Tinker was intended to control substantial disruption 
in schools, which is not the primary goal of restricting professional student 
speech.183 Although endangering the viability of a professional program could 
potentially be characterized as a “disruption,” the policy behind restricting pro-
fessional student speech is to ensure compliance with established professional 
codes and ethical guidelines.184 Therefore, although Tinker, like Hazelwood, 
could be stretched to regulate certain non-curricular professional student 
speech, its reasoning is similarly ill-suited to the task.185  
C. Adopting Tatro: A Carefully Considered Standard Prepared  
to Combat the Complications of Virtual Communication 
The Tatro standard solves many of the problems associated with extend-
ing Hazelwood and Tinker by building upon the underlying policies of those 
cases while remaining limited in its own application to certain professional 
student speech.186 Specifically, the limiting language of this standard avoids 
over breadth by requiring that program rules be directly related and narrowly 
tailored to professional conduct standards.187 
This framework grants schools deference over the exact form and admin-
istration of program rules so long as those rules pertain explicitly to student 
speech concerning the specific course and are derived from a relevant profes-
                                                                                                                           
 182 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512–14 (focusing on speech that could foreseeably “materially dis-
rupt[] classwork or involve[] substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others”); Tatro, 816 
N.W.2d at 519–20 (“The Tinker substantial disruption standard does not fit the purposes of the sanc-
tions here.”); Heidlage, supra note 50, at 587 (noting that using a pure impact test under Tinker would 
allow school officials to regulate beyond school grounds almost limitlessly). 
 183 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513; Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 520. 
 184 See Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 520 (“The driving force behind the University’s discipline was not 
that [the student’s] violation of academic program rules created a substantial disruption . . . but that 
her Facebook posts violated established program rules that require respect, discretion, and confidenti-
ality in connection with work on human cadavers.”); Waldman, supra note 3, at 391. 
 185 See Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 521. 
 186 See id. at 522–23. 
 187 Id. (“Tying the legal rule to established professional conduct standards limits a university’s 
restrictions on Facebook use to students in professional programs and other disciplines where student 
conduct is governed by established professional conduct standards.”). In requiring this direct relation-
ship and mandating that program rules be narrowly tailored to established professional conduct stand-
ards, the court aimed to “limit the potential for a university to create overbroad restrictions that would 
impermissibly reach into a university student’s personal life outside of and unrelated to the program.” 
Id. 
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sional code of conduct or ethics.188 Therefore, although courts would defer to 
schools’ choices in actually forming conduct standards, they would not defer 
to schools with regard to the scope of those standards.189 One commentator has 
explained that the “directly related and narrowly tailored” standard is essential, 
especially in cases where a university is being permitted to reach beyond tradi-
tional curricular speech and into spaces such as student Facebook accounts.190 
This standard exists to prevent universities from creating “overbroad re-
strictions” that have the potential to “impermissibly reach into a university stu-
dent’s personal life outside of and unrelated to the program.”191 
When examining whether program rules are narrowly tailored to accom-
plish compliance with an established code of conduct, courts should look to the 
university’s restrictions on the mode, manner, and place of student speech.192 A 
school’s program rules should not be “substantially broader than necessary” to 
achieve compliance with a professional code, but they also need not be the 
least restrictive nor the least intrusive means of doing so.193 For example, the 
program rules in Tatro permitted “respectful and discreet” discussion on dis-
                                                                                                                           
 188 See id. at 522. Schools are often given deference over the form and institution of their own 
rules because those decisions are decidedly curricular. Id. at 522–23. The court in Tatro found it sig-
nificant on this point that the program rules in the case before it did not require “respectful and dis-
creet behavior on Facebook generally, but explicitly pertain[ed] to statements about cadaver dissection 
and the anatomy lab.” Id. at 522. 
 189 See id. at 522–23; Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 952 (9th Cir. 2002). The wording used by the 
court in Tatro appears to implicate cases such as Grutter v. Bollinger, decided by the U.S. Supreme Court 
in 2003. See 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003) (employing a standard of strict scrutiny). In such cases, a universi-
ty is entitled to deference in creating rules and goals it deems as being necessary to its educational mis-
sion, although it is entitled to no deference on the means it chooses to attain those goals, which must be 
narrowly tailored. Id. 
 190 See Waldman, supra note 3, at 423–24 (asserting that where a university is regulating non-
curricular speech, the university should have to show “that its concerns were ‘narrowly tailored and 
directly related to established professional conduct standards,’” rather than requiring that the student 
demonstrate “that the university’s concerns reflected a ‘substantial departure from professional 
norms,’ and deferring to the university’s conceptions of professionalism and competence”). 
 191 Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 521; see Waldman, supra note 3, at 423. Many public university pro-
grams have, at least at one time, employed speech codes that were unconstitutional. Williams, supra note 
49, at 724–25. The court in Tatro noted explicitly that even if a student signs an agreement that condi-
tions his or her participation in a lab or course upon her compliance with the course rules, a university 
generally cannot impose a course requirement that forces a student to agree to otherwise invalid re-
strictions on his or her free speech rights. Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 521 n.6. 
 192 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989) (providing a test for “time, place, or 
manner” of speech restrictions); Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 523 (applying the test articulated in Rock 
Against Racism). 
 193 See Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 800, 803 (holding a city regulation requiring the city’s 
sound technician to control the volume level during concerts was “a reasonable regulation of the place 
and manner of expression” because it was “narrowly tailored to serve the substantial and content-
neutral government interests” of limiting excessive volume without overly restricting city channels of 
communication); Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 523 (holding that the course rules imposed by the University 
of Minnesota were “narrowly tailored” because they were not “substantially broader than necessary” 
to ensure that cadavers were treated in compliance with professional conduct standards).  
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section outside the lab but prohibited blogging about dissection.194 That rule 
protected private conversation yet prohibited online discussion that could po-
tentially be viewed by thousands.195 The course rules imposed by the Mortuary 
Science Program in Tatro existed to teach students to comply with professional 
ethics and to protect the program itself, but were applied narrowly to ensure 
respect for both the cadavers and for students’ constitutional rights.196 
For these reasons, applying the Tatro standard to permit universities to 
regulate non-curricular professional student speech would be preferable to 
reaching that result by extending either Hazelwood or Tinker.197 Nevertheless, 
applying the Tatro standard gives rise to two possible problems that courts 
would need to resolve.198 First, professional rules can often be vague or un-
clear.199 Courts may safely resolve that concern, however, because they possess 
both the experience and the expertise necessary to clarify vague rules.200 
Second, some professional rules are enforced despite being unwritten.201 
Such rules include customary guidelines that emerge over time within a pro-
fession.202 Enforcing unwritten rules too permissibly could allow universities to 
                                                                                                                           
 194 Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 522. 
 195 Id. at 523. Although Tatro argued that no one was identified or threatened by her comments, 
the court observed that her posts were undoubtedly in reference to her human cadaver and that her 
commentary was simply “incompatible with the notions of respect and dignity for the individual who 
chose to donate his body.” Id. at 515, 523. The court noted further that this conclusion was reinforced 
when “the publicity surrounding [the student’s] posts resulted in letters and calls to the Anatomy Be-
quest Program from donor families and the public regarding [the student’s] poor judgment and lack of 
professionalism.” Id. at 532. 
 196 See id. at 532. 
 197 See supra notes 186–196 and accompanying text. 
 198 See infra notes 199–206 and accompanying text. 
 199 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 149A.70 (2014) (defining unprofessional conduct as including the 
“failure to treat with dignity and respect the body of the deceased, any member of the family or rela-
tives of the deceased, any employee, or any other person encountered while within the scope of prac-
tice, employment, or business”); AMA, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, Opinion 6.02–Fee Splitting (up-
dated June 1994) (“A physician may not accept payment of any kind, in any form, from any source 
. . . for prescribing or referring a patient to said source.”); ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL 
ETHICS, Canon 21 (1970) (“The lawyer has the obligation to represent his client with complete loyal-
ty.”). 
 200 See Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 521–22 (interpreting a Minnesota statute on treating cadavers with 
dignity and respect); see also Martello v. Santana, 874 F. Supp. 2d 658, 671 (E.D. Ky. 2012), aff’d, 
713 F.3d 309 (6th Cir. 2013) (interpreting Opinion 6.02 of the American Medical Association Code of 
Ethics on Fee Splitting); Robles Sanabria, ex parte, MC-90-21, 1993 WL 840029 (P.R. June 25, 1993) 
(interpreting Canon 21 of the 1970 Code of Professional Ethics on loyalty to legal clients). 
 201 See Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727,739 (6th Cir. 2012) (allowing evidence from university text-
books, professors, studies, and experts to demonstrate that values-based referrals were accepted prac-
tice under the ACA Code of Ethics); Waldman, supra note 3, at 424. 
 202 See Polite, 667 F.3d at 739; Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 521 (discussing Tatro’s argument that the 
university was, in effect, seeking to enforce unwritten social norms). 
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punish students under the pretext of university regulation.203 Although courts 
have not yet established a consistent rule for dealing with this situation, at least 
one commentator has argued that, when relying upon an unwritten standard, 
courts should simply require universities to establish that the standard is “firm-
ly established in the field.”204 This rule, if adopted, would prevent abuse and 
limit the ability of universities to use a professional code as a pretext to punish 
students’ protected speech.205 Although this may not be the only tenable rule, 
when an unwritten or uncodified standard is at issue, a high degree of scrutiny 
should be applied to ensure both that the standard is established in the relevant 
professional field and that the student was made aware of that standard in ad-
vance of his or her unprotected speech.206 
Despite these potential downsides, the standard articulated in Tatro is the 
most effective way to deal with non-curricular professional speech that violates 
an established code of ethics.207 The Tatro framework balances the rights of stu-
dents, the needs of universities, and the ethical constraints of the professions.208 
CONCLUSION 
Non-curricular speech violations of professional ethics by students in pro-
fessional programs occupy a niche in the student speech setting. Although the 
policy underlying the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Hazelwood and Tink-
er supports the regulation of professional student speech, simply relying on 
those cases to support such regulation would lead to imprecision and over-
breadth. In 2012, however, in Tatro v. University of Minnesota, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court offered an alternative legal platform to support the regulation 
of professional student speech. The Tatro standard permits universities to pro-
tect their programs from speech that is otherwise beyond the scope of educa-
tional speech limitations, prevents overbroad university codes from unconstitu-
                                                                                                                           
 203 See Polite, 667 F.3d at 737 (implying skepticism about an unwritten policy and noting that 
unwritten yet-to-be-enforced policies are often the hallmark of pretextual cases); Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 
524. 
 204 See Waldman, supra note 3, at 424; cf. Polite, 667 F.3d at 737 (discussing the comparative 
values of a written code of ethics and unwritten, “yet-to-be-enforced” course rules). 
 205 See Polite, 667 F.3d at 739. 
 206 Waldman, supra note 3, at 424 (students should receive “prior notice about engaging in the 
speech in question”). 
207 See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271 (limiting itself to curricular activity); Tinker, 393 U.S. at 
512–13 (allowing broad regulation of speech that might substantially interfere with the operation of a 
school); Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 518–20 (explaining the shortcomings of Hazelwood and Tinker in the 
non-curricular professional speech context and providing a test designed to avoid over-breadth). 
208 See Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 521–22 (discussing its new test, designed to give credence to estab-
lished professional ethics, the academic needs of universities, and student speech rights); see also 
Patrick, supra note 125, at 892 (explaining the need to balance the interests of all involved parties 
when regulating student speech); Sun et al., supra note 159, at 93 (advocating for a balanced standard 
in the professional program context). 
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tionally infringing upon students’ rights, and has a strong basis in the past poli-
cies articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court. For that reason, courts faced with 
questions involving the regulation of professional speech should look beyond 
the Hazelwood and Tinker decisions and instead adopt the Tatro standard as a 
basis to conclude that otherwise professionally sanctionable student speech in 
a university professional program does not enjoy First Amendment protection. 
MARK A. CLOUTIER 
  
 
